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Why the Realist-Instrumentalist Debate about Rational Choice 






Within the social sciences, much controversy exists about which status should be ascribed to 
the rationality assumption that forms the core of rational choice theories. Whilst realists argue 
that the rationality assumption is an empirical claim which describes real processes that cause 
individual action, instrumentalists maintain that it amounts to nothing more than an 
analytically set axiom or ‘as if’ hypothesis which helps in the generation of accurate 
predictions. In this paper, I argue that this realist-instrumentalist debate about rational choice 
theory can be overcome once it is realised that the rationality assumption is neither an 
empirical description nor an ‘as if’ hypothesis, but a normative claim. 
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Within the social sciences, much controversy exists about which status should be 
ascribed to the rationality assumption that forms the core of rational choice theories. 
In one corner of the ring, we find realists who argue that the rationality assumption is 
an empirical claim which describes real processes that cause individual action. In the 
other corner, we see instrumentalists who maintain that the rationality assumption 
amounts to nothing more than an analytically set axiom, an ‘as if’ hypothesis or useful 
fiction, which helps in the generation of accurate predictions. In this paper, I approach 
the realist-instrumentalist debate from a different angle by bringing a distinctly 
normative interpretation of rationality to the contest. This understanding submits that, 
contrary to realist or instrumentalist readings, rationality is a normative concept, with 
ascriptions of rationality being normative judgements that evaluate agents, their 
actions and intentional states.1 I will argue that this interpretation is correct: the 
rationality concept is normative. My main objective, though, will be to show that once 
the realist-instrumentalist debate is seen to rest on a mistaken interpretation of the 
rationality assumption, this debate loses its footing. More generally, then, this paper is 
driven by the conviction that discussions about rationality within the social sciences, 
                                                             
1 To avoid misunderstanding right from the outset, this normative account submits that the 
rationality concept is normative, not that it is ethical or moral. 
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metaethics and the philosophy of science can greatly benefit by taking each other’s 
findings more strongly into account. It thus seeks to contribute to an interdisciplinary 
approach which aims to bring together different strands of enquiry so as to make best 
use of their respective insights.  
I will start by clarifying what is understood by the rationality assumption together 
with its realist and instrumentalist interpretations. This will be followed by arguments 
for the normativity of rationality. I will then turn to my main objective, setting out 
how the normativity of rationality helps overcome the realist-instrumentalist debate. 
The paper concludes by examining possible objections to the normative account and 
its implications for positive uses of normative rationality assumptions in the social 
sciences. 
2 The Rationality Assumption 
Rational choice theory is concerned with instrumental rationality. As such, its 
underlying rationality assumption can be stated as follows: 
(RA)  A rational agent A chooses the best means so as to attain a specific end, 
given A’s beliefs.  
More formalised, we find the following definition in the rational choice literature: 
(RA*)  A rational agent A maximises the expected value of a utility function 
defined on C, relative to a subjective probability distribution defined on 
B.2 
Accordingly, (RA)’s concern is threefold (List/Pettit 2011: 24): It deals with the way in 
which A’s attitudes connect with his environment (attitude-to-fact standards), how 
A’s preferences3 and beliefs relate to one another (attitude-to-attitude standards) and 
how these propositional attitudes result in action (attitude-to-action standards). With 
regard to attitude-to-fact relations, (RA) implies that rationality ascriptions are to be 
based on an agent’s subjective perception of the situation, not its objective 
description. Concerning attitude-to-attitude relations, beliefs and preferences are 
required to meet certain coherence criteria, such as consistency and transitivity 
together with constraints on probability distributions. This makes possible consistent 
belief sets and orderings of preferences. In accordance with modern utility theory, the 
content of preferences is left open and not limited to specific considerations. Finally, 
attitude-to-action standards demand that actions maximise expected value, where any 
such maximisation is again regarded as relative to A’s subjective beliefs. It must be 
noted that this specification of the rationality assumption is one amongst several 
possible interpretations. I will return to some such alternatives in the penultimate 
section of this paper. 
How do (RA) and (RA*) relate? I will assume here that (RA*) is a formal 
representation of RA: It offers a mathematical formalisation of our folk psychological 
approach to intentional, purposeful action (Hausman 2012). Acknowledging that 
(RA*) is RA’s mathematical representation is crucial for our understanding of the 
realist-instrumentalist debate. For, as Lehtinen/Kuorikoski (2007: 123) stress, since 
utility functions are nothing more than mathematical representations of preference 
                                                             
2 This is an adaptation of Binmore’s (1998: 360-361) definition. 
3 I will use the terms ‘preference’, ‘desire’ and ‘end’ interchangeably here. 
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orderings which are, moreover, open to certain mathematical transformations, (RA*) 
can only ever be read as an ‘as if’ claim. Consequently, the realist-instrumentalist 
debate should not be understood as revolving around (RA*): the question is not 
whether or not agents really employ the mathematical terms of rational choice theory, 
have utility functions and calculate expected utilities. Rather, the focal point of the 
realist-instrumentalist debate concerns the status of (RA) and thus the question of 
whether or not agents really choose in the way that (RA) envisages. Let us turn to this 
debate next. 
3 Realism vs. Instrumentalism 
Realists can be distinguished from instrumentalists by their stances on the following 
three theses: 
 
(1)  (RA) is an empirical claim about unobservables. 
(2)  It is an open question whether or not actual agents are rational. 
(3)  Actual agents are rational. 
 
Realists endorse all three claims. According to them, the concept of rationality refers 
to the property of rationality, just as (RA) depicts causal mechanisms that underlie the 
decision-making process of human beings (1). Realists thus interpret RA empirically: 
Although RA concerns unobservables—after all, what we can directly observe is 
agents’ behaviour, not their rationality—ascribing rationality to agents amounts to 
putting forward an empirical description of their psychologies.4 This enables (RA) to 
feature not only in predictions, but also in the explanation of phenomena that interest 
us. Since (RA) is an empirical claim, tests must show whether or not agents really are 
rational (2). Yet, realists submit that this is a question that we should answer in the 
positive: (RA) is, even if maybe not outright true, at least a good approximation of the 
truth (3).5 
Instrumentalists disagree. Contrary to (1), they argue that (RA) should be 
understood as nothing more than an ‘as if’ hypothesis6 or stipulated axiom which we 
employ in analytic models so as to develop accurate predictions. Since (RA) makes no 
claim whatsoever about processes that are operative in actual agents’ psychologies, 
seeking to test (RA) is beside the point. Yet, if we leave our analytic models behind 
and enquire whether or not actual agents do indeed choose as this axiom envisages, 
instrumentalists agree with (2) that this is an open question. Nonetheless, they reject 
(3): Either, they declare that actual agents are not rational,7 or they stay non-committal 
on whether or not they are. Either way, they hold that (RA) retains its usefulness as a 
model-theoretic axiom as long as it helps produce accurate predictions. Whether or 
                                                             
4 See Popper (1967) for the peculiar position that the rationality assumption is empirical and 
indeed false, but that we should nevertheless hold on to it, and Lagueux’s (1993) attempt to 
salvage this position. See Hempel (1962) for the claim that the rationality assumption might be 
abandoned in tests. 
5 Realists’ endorsement of (3) is compatible with the thesis that (RA) is a deliberately false, 
idealised empirical description (Mäki 2000). Realists’ claim would then be that actual 
conditions sufficiently approximate these idealised conditions. Since this variation on realism 
does not affect my argument, I will neglect it here. 
6 As Lehtinen (2013) emphasises, only certain interpretations of ‘as if’ signal an instrumentalist 
outlook. 
7 Friedman (1953) sometimes appears to take up this stance, but compare Mäki (2000). 
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not actual agents really do choose as postulated by (RA) is none of instrumentalists’ 
business.8 
4 The Normativity of Rationality 
In contrast to both realist and instrumentalist interpretations, I suggest that (RA) 
should be understood as a normative claim. Holding rationality to be a normative 
concept is a widespread, albeit not uncontroversial, position in metaethics.9 Nor is it 
unknown in the social sciences, where Harsanyi (1976: 90), for instance, declares that 
“already at a common-sense level, rationality is a normative concept: it points to what 
we should do in order to attain a given end or objective.”10 Two features of the 
rationality concept support this normative interpretation.  
Firstly, rationality ascriptions are in a thin sense normative in that they are based 
on norms or standards: When determining whether or not an individual behaves 
rationally, we need to apply the rationality standards mentioned above. What endows 
these standards with thick normativity, though, is that they do not simply divide 
choices into the categories ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, but that these categorisations carry 
inherent positive and negative valence: Rational action makes sense, or can be 
supported by reasons, or has gone right in an important way, whereas irrational 
behaviour makes no sense, or cannot be supported by reason, or has gone wrong in an 
important way. We approve of rational action and criticise irrational choices. Rational 
and irrational behaviour are, therefore, not normatively on a par. Secondly, normative 
concepts are characterised by their intimate link to action in that, prima facie, we 
would expect individuals to be motivated to act in accordance with their normative 
judgements. This is particularly clear within the moral context: If John judges that one 
ought to help people in need, say, we would expect him to be inclined to help needy 
people when the situation arises. The rationality concept also possesses this practical 
import which is paradigmatic of normative concepts. For example, if John intends to 
travel to Berlin and agrees that it would be most rational for him to catch the train, we 
would expect him to step on a train, and not take the car, say. Rationality judgements, 
then, are not only associated with normative pressure to conform to them, but also 
subject irrational agents to criticism and the demand to correct failures of rationality in 
future.  
Yet, the rationality assumption is not only normative, it is also constitutive of 
agency. Donald Davidson (1980, 1984, 2004) indefatigably explains why. When 
ascribing intentional states to others and trying to understand their actions, we are 
engaged in the business of interpretation: Against the background of our own beliefs, 
we want to make intelligible each other’s actions and the intentional states that lead to 
these actions. The linchpin of interpretation is, in turn, provided by (RA). In a 
                                                             
8 Rational choice theory can also be understood as being engaged in the explication of the 
concept of rationality. If understood along these conceptual lines, analytic and normative 
readings of the rationality assumption need not be mutually exclusive, as the rationality 
assumption could be understood as the conceptual specification of the normative concept of 
rationality. 
9 Again, the term ‘metaethics’ should not mislead readers into thinking that the normative 
account interprets instrumental rationality as an ethical or moral concept. Strictly speaking, 
‘metanormativity’ would be a more appropriate label than ‘metaethics’ here. 
10 Compare Gibbard (1990), Southwood (2008), Broome (2007). See also Hands (2011, 2012) 




nutshell, we impute to agent A the desire to drink some water, say, if this desire makes 
intelligible his drinking the glass of water offered to him, provided that he has the 
belief that the glass contains water. Similarly, the belief that the glass contains water 
should be attributed to A if this belief makes sense of his drinking the water offered 
to him, provided that he has the desire to drink water. Finally, A’s drinking water will 
count as an action, provided that his wanting to have a drink of water and believing 
that the glass contains water are A’s reasons for his drinking water. More generally, 
then, when asking which propositional attitudes should be attributed to agents and 
how to understand their actions, we are guided by the normative question of which 
intentional states it would be most rational to have and which action would render the 
agent most intelligible. To adapt Sellars’ (1956/1997) words, interpreting agents thus 
amounts to embedding their actions within the space of reasons. 
This implies that judgements of rationality do not evaluate as rational or irrational 
independently ascertainable propositional attitudes of belief and desire—judgements 
of rationality are not normative add-ons to otherwise non-normative statements about 
agents’ intentional states. Instead, our conception of propositional attitudes is itself 
imbued with standards of rationality: It is they which determine which desires and 
beliefs to impute to an agent by subsuming an agent’s behaviour under a consistent, 
rational set of propositional attitudes. As such, they determine not only what counts as 
an action and who counts as an agent, but also how to individuate and ascribe beliefs 
and desires. Standards of rationality, then, are constitutive of intentional states and 
agency in that an individual who does not satisfy demands of rationality at some 
minimal level cannot count as an agent in the first place. In Føllesdal’s (1982: 312) 
words: The “assumption that man is rational is ... inseparable from other hypotheses 
that we make about man: that he has beliefs and values, that he acts, etc. We may in a 
given case be forced to give it up, but then we have to give up these other hypotheses, 
too.” 
5 The Mistake of the Realist-Instrumentalist Debate 
It is only a small step to see how the insight that (RA) is a normative, necessary 
precondition for thought and agency affects the realist-instrumentalist debate. Let us 
remind ourselves that this debate is sparked off by the following theses: 
 
(1)  (RA) is an empirical claim about unobservables. 
(2)  It is an open question whether or not actual agents are rational. 
(3)  Actual agents are rational. 
 
Realising that ascriptions of rationality are normative shows that both instrumentalists 
and realists are misguided, either in their respective take on these theses or in their 
reasons for adopting them. Contrary to (1), (RA) is a necessary, normative 
precondition for understanding ourselves as intelligible agents who act on the basis of 
their intentional states. As such, realists are wrong to conceive of (RA) as an empirical 
claim, just as instrumentalists are wrong to regard it as nothing more than an ‘as if’ 
hypothesis. At the same time, instrumentalists are indeed right to point out that 
attempts to falsify (RA) miss the mark. However, the reason why questions of 
empirical confirmation and falsification do not apply to (RA) is not grounded in 
(RA)’s allegedly analytic status, but in its normative nature: Since (RA) is located in the 
normative and not in the empirical realm, it cannot be empirically confirmed or 
disconfirmed. Contrary to (2), both realists and instrumentalists are mistaken in 
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thinking that it is a live question whether or not actual agents are indeed rational. Since 
rationality is constitutive of thought and agency, being an agent amounts to being a 
rational agent—without rationality, there is no agency. On the normative reading, 
then, the question of whether or not agents are rational is closed. Finally, with regard 
to (3), we can see that instrumentalists cannot withdraw to the evasive stance on 
(RA)’s truth which they intend to take up. In light of the special status of rationality 
norms as framework principles for agency discourse, there is no logical space for 
holding that we merely assume that agents act as if they were rational, without 
declaring that they are rational. Realists, in turn, are right to endorse (3), yet are wrong 
to support (3) on empirical grounds. The rationality of agents is not an empirical 
finding, but a precondition of the interpretive process. 
To sum up, the realist-instrumentalist debate is fuelled by the assumption that 
(RA) is a non-normative claim. Arguments to the effect that rationality is a normative 
concept which is constitutive of thought and agency show that this is a mistake. (RA) 
is neither open to empirical confirmation and disconfirmation—as realists would 
maintain—nor allows instrumentalists to take up a non-committal stance on agents’ 
rationality. The question ‘Are actual agents really rational or do we only speak as if 
they were rational?’ is, therefore, beside the point. 
6 Objections 
This argument may be too quick and simple to be fully convincing, so let us look at 
some possible objections to it. Here, I will limit my discussion to objections that 
accept the claim that rationality ascriptions are normative whilst questioning the 
impact that this normativity supposedly has on the realist-instrumentalist debate. I will 
focus on three worries that I deem the most pertinent. Many of these objections raise 
further, often thorny lines of enquiry. Pursuing these enquiries in full would go 
beyond the scope of this paper, so my responses will have to remain schematic at 
times. 
6.1 First Objection 
Any plausible theory of rationality must be able to account for cases of irrationality. 
After all, not only do cases of irrationality abound, we can even identify the processes 
that cause irrational decisions—just think of framing effects, weakness of will, 
cognitive biases or wishful thinking, to name but a few. Bearing in mind that the 
normative account renders questions about agents’ rationality closed, it might be 
concluded that it clearly fails this requirement and should, therefore, be rejected. 
This objection rightfully challenges the normative account to show how cases of 
irrationality can be reconciled with rationality’s constitutive role for thought and 
agency. To conclude that this challenge remains unmet, though, would be premature. 
For, whilst the normative account does indeed rule out global irrationality, it can allow 
for cases of localised irrationality. To elaborate, it might not always be possible to 
subsume an agent’s behaviour under a set of propositional attitudes which fully 
satisfies the rationality constraint. If so, we are indeed forced to admit that an agent is, 
in a certain respect, irrational. As long as these lapses of rationality remain sufficiently 
limited, though, they need not undermine agency status. How pervasive failures of 
rationality may be without threatening agency is, in turn, a further, normative 
question—it enquires how much irrationality we can absorb whilst still being able to 
conceive of an individual as an intelligible agent. Accordingly, the normative account 
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does acknowledge cases of irrationality, but stresses that this irrationality can only ever 
be local. Global irrationality entails loss of agency status.  
6.2 Second Objection 
I have mentioned above that the normative account employs a specific interpretation 
of the rationality assumption, whilst different specifications are also available. One 
such alternative could be the following:  
(RA**)  A rational agent A maximises his material self-interest relative to 
objective probability distributions. 
Contrary to (RA), (RA**) strictly constrains the content of preferences by focussing 
on material self-interest only and requires agents to have objectively true beliefs about 
their situation so as to count as rational. Here, critics may insist that it clearly is a live 
question whether or not individuals act in line with (RA**): Whether or not they 
pursue their self-interest and have correct beliefs about probability distributions is, 
after all, far from being settled. It might be objected, then, that the conclusions of the 
normative account either miss their target by wrongly focussing on (RA), or must be 
limited in scope so as to apply to (RA) only.  
Bearing in mind (RA)’s prominence and widespread employment in the social 
sciences, criticising the normative account’s focus on (RA) is not convincing. For the 
same reason, even if its conclusions applied to (RA) only, this would be a significant 
result. Still, questions about the scope of its conclusions are pressing, so let us look 
more closely at the status of alternative rationality specifications such as (RA**). 
Initially, we must note that just like (RA), (RA**) is neither an empirical claim nor an 
‘as if’ hypothesis, but a normative statement: It puts forward a specific interpretation 
of the value of rationality. Yet, in contrast to (RA), this suggested understanding is 
substantive in that it evaluates agents’ ends by identifying material self-interest as a 
rational desire and imposes stricter demands on rational belief. As such, (RA**) does 
not merely demand, like (RA), that an agent’s preferences, beliefs and actions stand in 
certain structural relations to one another, but also requires rational agents to have 
propositional attitudes with a specific content. Accordingly, if focus on (RA**) were 
to revive the realist-instrumentalist debate, this would have to be because of these 
additional demands on the content of agents’ propositional attitudes: The question 
‘Are actual agents really rational?’ would now have to be interpreted as the question 
‘Do actual agents really have these particular desires/beliefs?’. Here, critics are right: 
The normative account does not close questions about the specific content of agents’ 
desires and beliefs. For, although it entails that if an individual is an agent, his beliefs 
and desires adhere to (RA), it does not settle which beliefs and desires these are. As 
such, it does make sense to ask ‘Are actual agents really self-interested, or do we 
merely assume that they are?’.11 However, against the background of the normative 
account, this question now takes on a different hue. For, since the normative account 
has shown propositional attitudes and instrumental rationality to be indispensable 
parts of agency, no fundamental doubts about instrumental rationality, unobservables, 
testability or propositional attitudes can drive this realist-instrumentalist question. Far 
from doubting the interpretive process, this query must rather be seen as being firmly 
located within it by enquiring about its outcomes in the form of specific attitude 
attributions. Consequently, focus on (RA**) does not reinstate the original realist-
                                                             
11 Unlike (RA), (RA**) is thus not constitutive of agency: Not pursuing one’s material self-
interest, say, does not undermine agency status. 
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instrumentalist contest, but reduces it to a truncated debate about the outcomes of the 
interpretive process, not its principles. As a result, it has lost much of its bite. 
6.3 Third Objection 
The final objection consists of three interrelated components. Firstly, the realist-
instrumentalist debate seems to be as much about the status of certain assumptions as 
it is about the aim of science. According to realists, science aims at true descriptions 
and explanations of the phenomena that interest us, which cannot be based on mere 
‘as if’ hypotheses. For instrumentalists, science aims at accurate predictions on 
grounds of parsimonious, generalisable assumptions, of which the ‘as if’ hypotheses of 
rational choice theory form one example. The normative account, it might thus be 
objected, does nothing to address this aspect of the realist-instrumentalist debate. 
Secondly, critics may object that the normative account assumes the social sciences to 
be interested in the explanation of individual action, whereas their research clearly 
focuses on the explanation of macro-phenomena. Whilst the rationality of agents may 
feature heavily when explaining individual action, these critics explain further, it plays 
no role within explanations of macro-phenomena, where the main explanatory burden 
is carried by situational and structural characteristics of the agent’s environment (cf. 
Lehtinen/Kuorikoski 2007). This important distinction and its implications are simply 
neglected by the normative account. Finally, as these previous objections indicate, 
social science widely employs theories of rationality in positive explanations and 
predictions. However, by interpreting (RA) as a normative claim, the normative 
account seems to preclude such positive uses of rational choice theory. 
The first component of this objection is partly right and partly wrong. It is wrong 
in that the normative account does intervene in the controversy about explanation and 
prediction insofar as it rules out arguments to the effect that rational choice 
explanations are impossible because (RA) can only ever be an ‘as if’ hypothesis. Since 
fundamental doubts about rationality and propositional attitudes are rejected by the 
normative account, such worries can no longer provide the grounds for rejecting 
rational choice explanation. It is right in that considerations about the normativity of 
rationality neither decide whether science should generally aim at explanation or 
prediction, nor settle whether there might be legitimate uses of ‘as if’ assumptions in 
the social sciences. However, since we should not expect normativity to be a magic 
wand that we can wave so as to solve all questions, and bearing in mind the 
multifaceted objectives of science, this is just as well.  
Secondly, there is indeed a difference between explanations of individual action 
and those of macro-phenomena. However, this difference is not categorical. To 
elaborate, take the example of high cost situations which are often quoted in order to 
illustrate the relevance of structural constraints. In cases such as these, situational 
restrictions are taken to be so severe that they determine behaviour and thus render 
detailed enquiries into individuals’ preferences superfluous. As a consequence, the 
explanatory burden is carried by structural features, not preferences. But even if so, we 
must realise that whilst high cost restrictions make it easier to ascribe preferences, they 
do not make preference ascriptions redundant. For, what allows us to narrow down 
the content of preferences so considerably in high cost situations is that it is easier to 
determine which preferences it would be rational for agents to have, given their severe 
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situational restrictions. (RA) is, therefore, not only involved in the explanation of 
individual actions, but is also implicitly at work in structural explanations.12  
Finally, it is true that it is not obvious how normative considerations of rationality 
can feature in positive social science, so we must ask how the normative and positive 
functions of rationality can be reconciled. Luckily, though, much work has already 
been done on the connection between reason and cause. Since a full account of this 
connection would go far beyond the scope of this paper, let me merely indicate here 
what would be required in order to achieve a reconciliation of rationality’s positive and 
normative functions. With regard to explanation, we would have to explain how 
normative accounts of action that appeal to agents’ rationality and reasons relate to 
causal explanations of action. Any such explanation must include, amongst others, 
considerations about the connection between reason and cause, the non-normative 
supervenience base of normative rationality judgements and its link with mental 
causation, the possibility of psycho-physical laws and questions about normative 
explanations.13 If prediction is understood as the symmetric counterpart to 
explanation, the same thoughts apply. With regard to predictions that do not harbour 
any explanatory ambitions, though, the normativity of rationality does not appear to 
pose much of an obstacle. Since in this case, we are not concerned with questions as 
to why predictions are correct, but only that they are correct, we can assume anything 
we like. As long as the generated predictions prove to be accurate, neither the status of 
these assumptions nor their truth matter. Of course, we may find such non-
explanatory predictions highly unsatisfying. The reason for this, though, is not found 
in considerations about the normativity of rationality, but in general questions about 
the relation between prediction and explanation. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have endorsed and argued for the position that the rationality 
assumption is normative. I have further suggested that the normativity of rationality 
helps to overcome the realist-instrumentalist debate about rational choice. The 
question ‘Are actual agents really rational or do we only speak as if they were rational?’ 
is, therefore, beside the point. Still, many questions remain unanswered. Most 
pressingly, we need to understand better the role of normative considerations of 
rationality in positive social science. It is this question which should attract our 
attention, not debates about realism and instrumentalism. 
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